The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

July 2015

Daubert, Probabilities and Possibilities, and the
Ohio Solution: A Sensible Approach to Relevance
Under Rule 702 in Civil and Criminal Applications
Andrew W. Jurs

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Evidence Commons
Recommended Citation
Jurs, Andrew W. (2008) "Daubert, Probabilities and Possibilities, and the Ohio Solution: A Sensible Approach to
Relevance Under Rule 702 in Civil and Criminal Applications," Akron Law Review: Vol. 41 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Jurs: A Sensible Approach to Rule 702 Relevance
JURS_FINAL

3/23/2009 2:54 PM

DAUBERT, PROBABILITIES AND POSSIBILITIES, AND THE
OHIO SOLUTION: A SENSIBLE APPROACH TO
RELEVANCE UNDER RULE 702 IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
APPLICATIONS
Andrew W. Jurs*

I. Introduction .............................................................................. 610
II. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert Decision....... 611
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is Adopted but Frye
Remains the Test in Federal Courts ............................ 611
B. Daubert in 1993 Determines Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 Replaced Frye ...................................... 613
C. Post-Daubert Supreme Court Decisions – Joiner
and Kuhmo .................................................................. 615
D. Admissibility Under Rule 702 After Daubert,
Joiner and Kuhmo – Relevance and Reliability .......... 616
III. Relevance and Rule 702 – Probabilities vs. Possibilities
and the Strength of Opinion Issue ..................................... 617
A. Federal Law - Probabilities and Possibilities .............. 618
B. State Appellate Decisions on Rule 702 Relevance ..... 624
C. The Ohio Split Approach to Rule 702 Relevance ....... 630
IV. Ohio Represents a Sensible Approach to the Relevance
Issue ................................................................................... 633
A. In Civil Cases, Rule 702 Relevance Should Require
Expert Opinions to a Probability................................. 634
B. In Criminal Cases, the Correct Rule 702 Relevance
Standard is Expert Opinions to a Possibility............... 643
V. Conclusion .............................................................................. 648

*B.A., Stanford University. J.D., University of California, Berkeley – Boalt Hall School of Law.
Mr. Jurs currently serves as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Colorado. The opinions
expressed are those of the author alone and do not represent the position of the State of Colorado or
the Colorado Office of the Attorney General. The author wishes to thank Katie and Clara, without
whom this article would not have been possible.

609

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 1
JURS_FINAL

610

3/23/2009 2:54 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:609

I. INTRODUCTION
At trial, the following litigants proffer these expert opinions:
• in a civil case, a plaintiff offers an expert toxicologist who
states it is possible the plaintiff’s exposure to a chemical
caused the injuries; and
• in a criminal case, the prosecution offers an expert in
fingerprint analysis who states the fingerprint of the
defendant could not be ruled out as a match to a partial
print at the scene of the crime charged.
The two opinions’ admissibility depends on a wide variety of
factors, including the qualifications of the witness and the reliability of
the scientific principles the expert uses to provide his or her analysis.
However, in assessing relevance under the Federal Rule of Evidence
702 1 test in use in federal courts since Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2 and in many state courts, judges must use
varying standards for admission, so the admissibility of the two
examples could depend on the jurisdiction in which the evidence is
offered.
If the expert opinions described above were offered in the State of
Mississippi, both would be excluded as inadequate under the relevance
prong of Rule 702. If offered in the State of Colorado, both opinions
would be admissible as relevant under Rule 702. Admissibility in
federal courts using the Daubert analysis could depend on the appellate
circuit or on the substance alleged to be harmful in the civil case.
Since the state and federal courts evaluate expert opinions using
similar, if not identical, Rule 702 language, the wide divergence of Rule
702 relevance analysis injects uncertainty into the process and could
significantly affect the outcome of cases based on the jurisdiction in
which they are tried.
A different “split” approach guides Rule 702 relevance analysis in
Ohio. The split approach permits expert opinions stated to a possibility
in criminal cases but requires opinions stated to a probability for civil
cases; this analysis, unlike the Colorado or Mississippi approach, would
admit the second proffered opinion described above, while excluding the
first proffered opinion from jury consideration. The split approach

1. FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975).
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
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offers significant advantages over the all-or-nothing jurisdictions’
interpretations of Rule 702, and therefore, the Ohio model offers a
sensible approach for courts in other jurisdictions to follow.
Probability for expert opinions is the correct standard for civil cases
based on the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. Among
other effects, the probability requirement reduces jury speculation,
avoids absurdity, appropriately adopts legal relevance as the standard for
admission, and avoids negative effects on the out-of-courtroom practices
of professionals.
Expert opinions explaining possibilities, while
inappropriate for civil case consideration, have Rule 702 relevance and
are useful in criminal cases based upon the beyond a reasonable doubt
burden of proof.
Based on an evaluation of federal and state cases, Rule 702, and the
purposes of expert testimony, the Ohio example of split relevancy
standards for expert opinions offered in criminal and civil cases is an
appropriate, reasonable, and sensible approach to Rule 702 relevance.
II. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 AND THE DAUBERT DECISION
Courts initially evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony
under common law standards. In 1923, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia established a uniform standard for admissibility of
expert testimony in Frye v. United States. 3 In the Frye case, the court
stated that scientific information will be admissible when it is well
recognized and “sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” 4
After more than sixty years of preeminence, the Frye general
acceptance test remained as the standard method for determining expert
evidentiary admission. 5 Judicial analysis of expert admissibility would
begin to change only well after the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
A.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is Adopted but Frye Remains the Test
in Federal Courts

Initially drafted and approved by Order of the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1972, the Federal Rules of Evidence did not take effect until 1975. 6
3.
4.
5.
(1983).
6.
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The Federal Rules adopted in 1975 included evidentiary rules for expert
testimony. Among the new rules was Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
which, in its initial form, stated:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise. 7

In 1972, the Rules Advisory Committee described two major
considerations under the Federal Rules for determining whether an
expert should testify. These considerations contrast with the Frye test,
which involved a unipolar analysis of the general acceptance of the
proposed expert testimony to determine reliability.
First, an expert is appropriate when the expert testimony would
assist the trier of fact in his or her analysis. The Rules Advisory
Committee explained:
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be
used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman
would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible
degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a
specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute. 8

Second, the committee answered the question of who is an expert,
stating that “the fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not
limited merely to the ‘scientific’ and ‘technical’ but extend to all
‘specialized’ knowledge.” 9 The committee continued, “[t]hus within the
scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word,
e.g., physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group

Stat. 1926, § 3 (1975) (enacting the rules).
7. FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975). Since the Daubert decision, the rule was amended to state:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (2001) (amendments effective December 1, 2000).
8. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes to 1972 proposed rules (citing Mason Ladd,
Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952)).
9. Id.
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sometimes called ‘skilled’ witnesses, such as bankers or landowners
testifying to land values.” 10
By applying the committee notes from 1972, courts could have had
guidelines on whether an expert should testify. However, federal courts
after 1975 had little or no guidance on the interrelationship of Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 and the Frye test in determining the admissibility
of expert testimony. In the United States v. Abel decision from 1984, the
U.S. Supreme Court determined that the common law predating the
Federal Rules continued to determine evidentiary admissibility after the
1975 enactment of the rules. 11 By so ruling, the Supreme Court limited
the roles of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Advisory Committee
Notes for another decade, and ensured Frye remained preeminent.
Into the 1990s, federal courts generally continued to use the Frye
general acceptance test to determine whether expert testimony would be
admissible. 12
B.

Daubert in 1993 Determines Federal Rule of Evidence 702
Replaced Frye

The test for expert admissibility in federal courts dramatically
changed with the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daubert v.
Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 13
In the Daubert decision, the Supreme Court rejected the Frye
general acceptance test by determining that the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975 superseded federal common law on
evidentiary issues. 14 Relying on the liberal admissibility standard of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the adoption of a specific rule on the
admissibility of expert testimony, Justice Blackmun wrote for a
unanimous court that the austere rule of general acceptance from Frye is

10. Id.
11. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984) (issue of impeachment by bias) (citing E.
CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 40, at 85 (3d ed. 1984); 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 341, at 470 (1979); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S
EVIDENCE, para. 607[03] (1981)).
12. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991);
Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
912 (1992); United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993). But see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d
1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
13. 509 U.S. at 587.
14. Id.
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“absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
[and] should not be applied in federal trials.” 15
With the admissibility of expert testimony to be determined by
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, federal judges must act as evidentiary
gatekeepers to ensure expert testimony is both relevant to the issues in
the case and has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the
specialty discipline. 16
Daubert described relevance to the case as determined by the “fit”
of the expert testimony to the case. 17 The Court acknowledged that
“[f]it is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not
necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.” 18 The
Court continued: “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires a valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility.” 19
For the reliability analysis, the Supreme Court stated the general
role of a court would be to assess preliminarily “whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether the reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue.” 20 While many factors bear on this analysis, the Court
suggested specific factors for the district courts to consider, including:
scientific methodology or testing, publication and peer-review, the
known or potential rate of error, the existence of standards and controls,
and the general acceptance of the methodology within the relevant
scientific community. 21 These factors may be considered by the trial
judge at a preliminary Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) hearing to assess
the admissibility of the evidence, and reliability should be shown to a
preponderance of the evidence. 22
Even if expert evidence is admissible under the relevance and
reliability test, a court may exclude it if it fails a Rule 403 analysis, i.e.,
when the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

15. Id. at 589.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 591.
18. Id. at 591 (citing James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A
Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 258 (1986)).
19. Id. at 591-92.
20. Id. at 592-93.
21. Id. at 593-94. See also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes to the 2000
Amendments, ¶ 2.
22. Id. at 592 & n.10 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)).
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unfair prejudice. 23
The Court emphasized that the Rule 702 inquiry is “a flexible one.
Its overarching subject is the scientific validity - and thus the evidentiary
relevance and reliability - of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” 24
With the establishment of the Rule 702 standard for the
admissibility of evidence, Daubert required that courts make a
determination of both relevance and reliability of expert testimony prior
to submission of an expert opinion to the jury.
C.

Post-Daubert Supreme Court Decisions – Joiner and Kuhmo

While the Daubert decision offered a dramatic shift in the analysis
for admissibility of expert testimony in federal court, it failed to provide
details on the procedural and substantive burdens involved in a court’s
determination on the reliability and relevance of proposed evidence.
Additional Supreme Court decisions began to evaluate these closely
related Daubert issues.
In 1997, the Supreme Court issued the decision in General Electric
Co. v. Joiner. 25 In Joiner, the Court noted that Daubert established the
Federal Rules of Evidence as the standard for review of expert
testimony. 26 In doing so, the Daubert decision made the judge the
“gatekeeper” for screening evidence prior to submission to the jury. 27
The Joiner decision then determined that “abuse of discretion is the
proper standard of a review of a district court’s evidentiary rulings.” 28
Once the Joiner Court established the abuse of discretion standard,
the Court then applied the standard to the expert testimony in the case.
The Court determined the experts’ opinions were relevant to the case by
finding one expert testified that “it was more likely than not” that the
Plaintiff’s cigarette smoking and PCB exposure caused his cancer, and
the other expert stated the cancer was “caused by or contributed to in a

23. Id. at 595 (citing Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound;
It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F. R. D. 631, 632 (1991)).
24. Id. at 594-95 (citations omitted).
25. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
26. Id. at 142.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 141-42, 146 (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997);
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984); Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1879) (“[T]he
appellate court will not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous.”).
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significant degree by the materials with which he worked.” 29 However,
the Court found the opinions unreliable due to lack of proper support
from several epidemiological studies. 30 A court may properly determine
an expert opinion is unreliable if there is simply “too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” 31 This is because
“nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” 32
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael 33 in
1999 further delineated the process for a district court’s determination of
admissibility under Rule 702 and Daubert. The Kuhmo Court first
found that the gatekeeping function of the court applies to not just
scientific information, but to any scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge testimony under Rule 702. 34 The Court then
affirmed that district courts must make preliminary assessments of the
relevance and reliability per Daubert, and that district courts must be
granted latitude in deciding how to assess reliability of proposed expert
testimony. 35 In addition, the Court noted that the witness must initially
be qualified to provide the expert opinions, which then must be vetted
for reliability and relevance under Daubert. 36
Following Daubert, the Joiner and Kuhmo decisions clarified both
the process of reviewing Rule 702 expert evidence in a preliminary Rule
104(a) hearing, and the substantive requirements for reliability and
relevance of expert opinions.
D.

Admissibility Under Rule 702 After Daubert, Joiner and Kuhmo –
Relevance and Reliability

Through the Daubert, Joiner and Kuhmo decisions, the Supreme
Court established the prerequisites to admissibility of expert opinions

29. Id. at 143.
30. Id. at 144-45.
31. Id. at 146 (citing Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992)).
32. Id. (emphasis in original).
33. Kuhmo Tire Co., Ltd., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
34. Id. at 147-49.
35. Id. at 149 (discussing relevance and reliability under Daubert); Id. at 152 (discussing
latitude in making reliability determinations); Id. at 158 (noting discretion under FED. R. EVID. 702
to determine reliability on specific facts of the case).
36. Id. at 152 (discussing evaluation of qualifications of the witness done at the trial court
level, including education of the witness, experience in the field, and experience as an expert in
litigation).
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under Rule 702. To make preliminary determinations of admissibility, a
court may decide to hold a hearing under Rule 104. 37 The court may
choose not to hold a hearing when the reliability of the expert’s methods
is properly taken for granted. 38
If the court holds a Rule 104 hearing, the court must evaluate the
reliability of the methods employed by the expert. The Supreme Court
in Daubert provided a detailed but not exhaustive list of factors to
consider for the reliability determination, and later, in Kuhmo
reemphasized a judge’s ability to consider any information. 39
For the relevance prong of the analysis, the Daubert court
emphasized the “fit” of the opinions to the case. 40 While noting Rule
702 demands that the testimony relate to a fact at issue so that the
testimony aids the jury in resolving a factual dispute, the Court did not
provide guidance as it did with reliability on the specific inquiry or
analysis needed to establish relevance under Rule 702.41 The Court
merely stated that it is confident that federal judges can do the
appropriate review. 42
The relevance prong was poorly defined in the initial Supreme
Court cases, therefore the U.S. appellate courts have further reviewed
and defined expert opinion relevance under Rule 702. Federal appellate
courts have not been uniform in assigning a substantive burden
requirement for a litigant to establish the Rule 702 relevance of expert
testimony.
III. RELEVANCE AND RULE 702 – PROBABILITIES VS. POSSIBILITIES AND
THE STRENGTH OF OPINION ISSUE
Appellate courts addressing Rule 702 relevance have adopted a
variety of approaches to the issue. Many federal appellate decisions
require expert testimony to rise to the level of probability before being

37. Id.; General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc, 509 U.S. 579, 592 & n.10 (1993).
38. Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 152 (1999).
39. Id. at 149-53 (factors in Daubert not definitive); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; supra text
accompanying note 21. As part of the reliability prong in Kuhmo, the court discussed the issue of
qualifications of the expert as well. Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 153; supra text accompanying note 36.
Courts would later occasionally classify the qualifications prong of the test as a true third
assessment, rather than a subsection of reliability. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d
717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994).
40. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
41. Id. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
42. Id. at 593.
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admitted at trial. 43 On the other hand, several courts of appeal have used
a more lenient standard and permitted experts to present opinions rising
only to the level of possibility. 44
On the state court level, different state appellate courts have
adopted the two varying federal approaches: some states permit experts
to express opinions to a possibility under Rule 702, while others insist
on probabilities prior to finding Rule 702 relevance. 45 Even modifiedFrye jurisdictions have split on the issue. 46 Rejecting the strict
interpretations, Ohio has adopted a more flexible split approach,
requiring the standard of expert opinions to a probability for civil cases
while permitting opinions to the level of a possibility in criminal cases. 47
In contrast to the uniformity and clarity in the Daubert opinion and
its progeny regarding the Rule 702 reliability analysis and factors for
reliability consideration prior to admission, the case law on Rule 702
relevance analysis shows a divergence and disagreement on relevance
under Rule 702, and provides an opportunity to adopt a uniform
approach. 48
A.

Federal Law - Probabilities and Possibilities

Following the Daubert opinion, federal appellate courts have
inconsistently applied the substantive burden requirement for
establishing Rule 702 relevance. Soon after Daubert, the U.S. Courts of
Appeal in the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit addressed the interplay of
the substantive burden in a lawsuit and Rule 702 relevance, requiring
expert testimony to rise to the level of probabilities. In federal courts,
this substantive burden initially gained widespread acceptance, but has
since been questioned as recent federal appellate court decisions admit
expert testimony rising only to the level of possibilities.
1. Daubert and Paoli – Early Opinions and the Probability
Standard
After the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Daubert in
1993, the Court remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for the

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See infra Part III.A.1.
See infra Part III.A.2.
See infra Parts III.B.1 (probabilities needed), III.B.2 (possibilities permitted).
See infra Parts III.B.1. (California), III.B.2 (Illinois).
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part IV.
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Ninth Circuit for determination of the motion for summary judgment. 49
In accepting the remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that
remand directly to the District Court was necessary, finding that “the
interests of justice and judicial economy will best be served by deciding
those issues that are properly before us and, in the process, offering
guidance in the application of the Daubert standard in this circuit.” 50
The Daubert II court analyzed the proposed expert testimony under
the new Rule 702 analysis from Daubert, reviewing reliability and
relevance. 51 In addressing the reliability prong, the Daubert II court
acknowledged the “uncomfortable position” the judiciary occupied in
making determinations on cutting-edge science. 52 By analyzing the
reliability factors highlighted by Justice Brennan in Daubert, the
appellate court first weighed the expert toxicology opinion evidence in
the case and found the reliability of the opinions would have needed to
be addressed in the district court through the submission of additional
evidence. 53
The court then shifted to address the substantive burden required to
show the relevance of expert testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert.
The court started by finding that the standard in California for
pharmaceutical torts requires evidence that the medicine ingested caused
the alleged injuries of birth defects to a preponderance of the evidence. 54
Since the alleged birth defects also occur naturally, the plaintiffs in
Daubert II had the burden to show that the medication manufactured by
the defendant caused a doubling of the risk of birth defects. 55 When
doubling was shown, the plaintiffs could state that the medication then
“more likely than not [is] the source of their injury.” 56
To succeed in the litigation, the plaintiffs must present
epidemiological studies to prove the higher relative risk of birth defects
between mothers taking the medication compared to those who did

49. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F. 3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995).
50. Id. at 1315.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court also states that “[m]indful of our position in the hierarchy of the federal
judiciary, we take a deep breath and proceed with this heady task.” Id. at 1316.
53. Id. at 1320 (reliability need not be presented to the district court, however, based on the
second prong of the test). See also infra note 63 and accompanying text.
54. Id. (citing Jones v. Ortho Pharms. Corp., 209 Cal. Rptr. 456 (Cal. App. 1985)). In this
case, the alleged injuries are birth defects allegedly caused by ingestion of Bendectin. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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not. 57 Epidemiological risk must exceed “2.0” to satisfy the substantive
burden of a preponderance of the evidence standard. 58
Epidemiological evidence that fails to show an epidemiological risk
of “2.0” or higher is not helpful to the case and would only serve to
confuse the jury if offered to prove causation. 59 The Daubert II
plaintiffs’ experts’ strongest opinions stated that the medication “could
possibly” have caused plaintiffs’ injuries. 60 These opinions, based on
epidemiological studies, show the medication could possibly cause the
plaintiffs’ injuries rather than prove the medication probably caused the
injuries. 61 The plaintiffs’ causation evidence, therefore, failed to be
relevant to the issues in the case, to be determined under the
preponderance of the evidence standard. 62 As a result, the expert
opinions were deemed inadmissible under Rule 702, and the court in
Daubert II granted summary judgment. 63
Shortly after the original Daubert opinion, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed Rule 702 relevance in In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation. 64 Decided before the Daubert II case
was decided by the Ninth Circuit but after the initial Daubert opinion,
Paoli discussed the Daubert standard and the interplay of the substantive
burden of proof in civil cases with the relevance prong of Rule 702
analysis.
In Paoli, the court first reviewed the Daubert factors for expert
admissibility: reliability and relevance. The court then stated for
relevance to be established under Daubert and Rule 702, the scientific
research must connect to the “particular disputed factual issues in the
case.” 65
In assessing the Daubert fit of the expert testimony to the factual
issues in the case, the Paoli court then noted the interplay of the
Pennsylvania requirement for expert testimony to be to a “reasonable
57. Id. at 1321.
58. Id. (citing DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990)). For a
greater discussion of the epidemiological risk assessment of “2.0,” see Peter White, A Relative Risk
2.0: The Ninth Circuit Revisits Daubert’s Epidemiological Standard in In re Hanford Nuclear
Reservation Litigation, 13 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L. J. 33 (2004), and infra text accompanying
notes 73-79.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1322 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F.Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal.
1989) (the district court decision in the Daubert opinion line) (emphasis in original).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
65. Id. at 743 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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degree of medical certainty” and the substantive burden of proof. 66 The
court first found that the issues of burden of proof and admissibility
often overlap, and that in a prior decision the Third Circuit held that
expert opinions on “possibilities” or even “strong possibilities” were
inadequate for Rule 702 admissibility. 67
The Paoli court agreed with prior precedent that the combined
effect of the substantive burden of proof and Rule 702 requirements for
expert testimony require that the experts express their opinions to a
“reasonable degree of medical certainty.” 68 As a result, the court
determined that summary judgment is appropriate when experts cannot
state to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the illnesses of
the plaintiffs were caused by the chemicals in question. 69 Therefore, to
the extent that experts would testify to “possibilities” or even “strong
possibilities,” the testimony is not relevant to the case under the
combined effect of the civil burden of proof and Rule 702. 70
Following the Daubert II and Paoli decisions, other federal courts
adopted their reasoning on issues of Rule 702 relevance for expert
opinion testimony. 71 For example, in In re Breast Implant Litigation,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado stated that a
plaintiff’s causation expert testimony was “no more than a suggestion or
possibility of a causal relationship, which is insufficient for a causation
opinion under Colorado law, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
Daubert.” 72
66. Id. at 750-51.
67. Id. at 751 (citing Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 1991)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 752.
70. Id. at 751 (citing Schulz, 942 F.2d at 208). For application of this rule in the case to the
proposed plaintiff’s experts, see id. at 766 (chemicals “only a possible cause” of pregnancy injuries,
so inadequate to survive summary judgment) and id. at 767 n.34 (the opinion that chemicals “could”
have caused the illness is insufficient to survive summary judgment).
71. For examples of appellate court decisions, see, for example, Allison v. McGhan Med.
Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (exclusion of expert testimony is appropriate under
Rule 702 when the expert opinion fails to rise to the level of medical probability); Schudel v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds, Weisgram v. Marley Co.,
528 U.S. 440, 456 (2000). For additional similar opinions, see Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
397 F.3d 878, 884 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995))
(determining that expert testimony is analyzed to see if it “logically advances a material aspect of
the case”); Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 47 n. 9 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Daubert II, 43
F.3d at 1321) (determining how the burden of proof affects the relevance and, therefore, Rule 702
admissibility of expert testimony); Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 n.4 (3d Cir.
1999) (citing Paoli, 35 F.3d at 750-52).
72. In re Breast Implant Litig.,11 F.Supp. 2d 1217, 1237 (D. Colo. 1998). For U.S. District
Court cases with similar reasoning, see Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F.Supp. 2d 814, 822
(W.D. Tex. 2005); Anderson v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., No. H-95-003, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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With the Rule 702 relevance or “fit” analysis of the appeals court
decisions in Paoli and Daubert II, opinions of experts will be admitted
as relevant only when to a probability and will be excluded when expert
opinions are solely to a possibility. The initial appearance of consensus
on the issue faded after newer analysis by additional federal courts.
2. Newer Opinions and the Erosion of the Stricter Relevance
Standard
Since the Daubert II and Paoli case decisions, decisions by other
courts of appeal addressing Rule 702 relevance have not required
probabilities for expert testimony but have instead permitted experts to
testify to possibilities under Rule 702.
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit revisited the use of epidemiological
evidence in mass tort litigation from Daubert II in In re Hanford
Nuclear Reservation Litigation. 73 In the case, the district court insisted
that the plaintiff show epidemiological evidence to the level of “2.0,” as
mandated by the decision in Daubert II, in order to show that the
exposure “more likely than not” caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. 74 The
district court had rejected the expert testimony for lack of Rule 702
relevance when experts testified the exposure was only “capable of
causing a disease.” 75
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit readdressed the Daubert II Rule 702
relevance issue, and found that epidemiological proof of causation
requires a factor of “2.0” to meet the “more likely than not” standard. 76
Even if “2.0” is required to show probability, the court decided the
district court erred when, relying on Daubert II, it required
epidemiological proof to rise to the level of “2.0.” 77 The court stated

23259, at *10-11 (S.D. Tex. April 17, 1998); Lowery v. United States, No. 95-T-1614-N, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22840, at *6 (M.D. Ala. October 16, 1996); Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., No.
82-CV-710-H, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13568, at *16-17 (N.D. Okla. May 28, 1996).
73. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. at 1131-32.
75. Id. at 1132 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993)).
76. Id. at 1137 (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 167-169 (1st ed. 1994)).
77. Id. (citing In re Three Mile Island Lit., 193 F.3d 613, 727 n.179 (3d Cir. 1999)), amended
by 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000)). For a discussion critical of the standard that the epidemiological
proof of “2.0” is equivalent to a preponderance of the evidence standard, see White, supra note 58,
at 49 (citing Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers:
The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64 J. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 352-55
(2001)).
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that “the validity of a claim should not depend on whether a plaintiff was
exposed to a fraction of a rem lower than the ‘doubling dose.’” 78
As a result of the Hanford rejection of the Daubert II model for
epidemiological relevance, expert testimony that admittedly did not rise
to the level of the “more likely than not” standard would be permitted at
trial as relevant under Rule 702. The change represents a profound shift
from the strict Daubert II approach and permits experts to provide
opinions that rise only to the level of possibilities. 79
Similar to Hanford, the Third Circuit in United States v. Ford
addressed Rule 702 relevance of expert opinions and testimony to
possibilities. 80 In evaluating expert testimony regarding shoe print
identification, the court determined that the standard for Rule 702
relevancy is “not that high.” 81 The court further decided that the issue in
the case was whether the impressions of the shoe print was probative of
the Defendant’s participation in the robbery, and “expert testimony that
aids the jury to make such comparisons is admissible.” 82 Based on this
analysis, the court concluded that “[a]n expert opinion that expresses a
possibility that a crime scene impression may have been made by shoes
worn by the defendant, and otherwise comports with the Daubert
analysis, is clearly relevant to the question of whether the defendant was
present at the scene of the crime.” 83
The Ford court rejected the Paoli and Daubert II approach by
stating that its analysis of Rule 702 relevance is an exhortation to “tread
carefully when evaluating proffered expert testimony,” but that the
relevance of the expert opinions presented was not debatable in this
Based on Ford, in some cases and
criminal prosecution. 84
circumstances, expert testimony regarding possibilities will pass
relevance examination under Rule 702.
District court cases mirror the Hanford and Ford decisions in
rejecting a Rule 702 relevance requirement for expert opinions to be
stated to a probability, by accepting experts’ opinions on possibilities.
Even in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, where In re
78. In re Hanford, 292 F.3d at 1137.
79. The Hanford decision and reasoning was also dispositive in In re Berg Lit., 293 F.3d
1127, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2002), decided the same day by the Ninth Circuit.
80. United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215 (3d. Cir. 2007).
81. Id. at 219 (citing Lauria v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 600 (3d Cir. 1998)).
82. Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 220 n.6. Criminal prosecution as compared to civil litigation is addressed, infra
section IV. The issue of possibilities as relevant in criminal prosecution is also seen in United
States v. Sullivan, 246 F.Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
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Breast Implant Litigation strongly affirmed the language that expert
opinions to possibilities should be inadmissible under Rule 702, the
bulwark of probability no longer held firm. In 2004, Judge Blackburn
issued his ruling in Kaiser-Hill Co. v. MacTec. 85 In the Kaiser-Hill
decision, the court rejected an objection to expert opinions stated in the
form of “might” or “may,” since “[t]here is no requirement that an
expert state an opinion to any particular degree of certainty.” 86
Following the opinions in Hanford, Ford, and Kaiser-Hill, federal
court review of Rule 702 relevance is unclear on the requirement of the
substantive level of certainty for expert opinion admissibility. 87
Forming equally divergent viewpoints, state courts have also debated
and split on the issue of the substantive burden of relevance under Rule
702.
B.

State Appellate Decisions on Rule 702 Relevance

In addressing Rule 702 admissibility, various states have struggled
with the substantive relevance burdens established by Daubert-type
expert opinion analysis. The State of Mississippi requires expert
opinions to rise to the level of probabilities before being relevant and
appropriate for jury consideration, consistent with the first post-Daubert
federal appellate decisions. Adopting the opposite approach and
consistent with more recent federal appellate decisions, Colorado
adopted a lenient policy for establishing Rule 702 relevance by allowing
opinions on possibilities to be admissible. Even when applying
modified Frye analysis using relevance as a consideration, jurisdictions
have split on the issue of probabilities and possibilities, with California
prohibiting and Illinois permitting expert testimony rising to the level of
possibilities.
1. Mississippi and Relevance under Rule 702- Expert Opinions to

85. Kaiser-Hill Co. v. MacTec, Inc., No. 04-cv-02509-REB-CBS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29922 (D. Colo. August 11, 2004).
86. Id. at *11 (citing Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1236 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 395 (2005)). See also Gallegos v. Swift & Co, No. 04-cv-01295-LTB-CBS,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63492, at *12 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2006).
87. For U.S. District Court cases adopting the reasoning of, or with reasoning similar to,
Hanford and Ford, see In re Meridia Products Liab. Litig., 328 F.Supp. 2d 791, 801 n.4 (N.D. Ohio
2004); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Product Liab. Litig., 318 F.Supp. 2d 879, 893 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (applying to general causation, so as not to defy Daubert II); Sullivan, 246 F.Supp. 2d at 704.
Regarding the issue of criminal cases and arguments over accuracy of expert matching, such as in
Sullivan, see United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 564 (6th Cir. 1993).
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Probabilities Only in Both Civil and Criminal Cases
The Mississippi Supreme Court has concluded since Daubert that
expert opinions rising only to the level of possibilities are insufficient to
be relevant under Rule 702. In 2007, the prohibition was extended to
civil cases where expert opinions on medicine not rising to a probability
were also excluded.
In the 1996 decision Catchings v. State, the Mississippi Supreme
Court addressed Rule 702 relevance in the context of criminal
prosecution. 88 In the case, the treating physician of the crime victim had
been permitted to testify to the cause of death over an objection. 89 On
appeal after conviction, the defense claimed error in the admission of the
opinion on relevance grounds under Rule 702. 90
In deciding the issue, the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized
two facts to assist their analysis: that the Federal Rules do not conflict
with the Mississippi Rules so that Federal law on the Rule 702 issue is
helpful for analysis, 91 and that “[w]ithin the medical discipline, the
traditional standard for ‘factfinding’ is a ‘reasonable medical
certainty.’” 92 With those principles in mind, the court noted exclusion
of expert testimony for relevance is appropriate in cases where the
“expert testimony is speculative, [with experts] using such language as
‘possibility.’” 93
Therefore, the Court quotes federal case law for the proposition that
“the intent of the law is that if a physician cannot form an opinion with
sufficient certainty so as to make a medical judgment, neither can a jury
use that information to reach a decision.” 94 Since physicians make
medical judgments to a “reasonable medical certainty,” expert opinion
should also rise to the same standard to be admissible at trial. 95 While
making this judgment, the court does caution that the particular phrase
used should not necessarily be dispositive, but the test for proper
admissibility is whether the expert’s opinion was to a reasonable medical

88. Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591 (Miss. 1996).
89. Id. at 596.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 597 (citing Hopkins v. State, 639 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Miss. 1993)). Mississippi
adopted the FED. R. EVID. effective January 1, 1986. West v. State, 553 So. 2d 8, 34 (Miss. 1989).
92. Id. at 596 (citing Bethany v. Stubbs, 393 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Miss. 1981)). The court
notes that while the Bethany case predated the adoption of MISS. R. EVID. 702 in 1986, the standard
has not changed. Id.
93. Id. at 597 (citing Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 1991)).
94. Id. (citing Schulz, 942 F.2d at 208).
95. Id.
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certainty. 96
Following Catchings, in 2007 the Mississippi Court of Appeals
addressed a Rule 702 relevance issue in the civil case of Kidd v.
McRae’s Stores Partnership. 97 In that case, the claimant appealed the
trial court’s decision to limit the testimony of claimant’s expert on the
issue of future medical expenses, when the expert did not testify that
future surgeries would be needed “to a reasonable degree of medical
probability.” 98
In deciding the issue, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reiterated
that relevance under Rule 702 is based on the expert testimony assisting
the trier of fact to understand the evidence. 99 Then, relying on
Catchings, the court found that an expert opinion not to a “reasonable
degree of medical certainty,” or, that is not stated in a way to make the
opinion probable, is inadmissible as not relevant under Rule 702. 100
Under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted for the civil
and criminal cases Catchings and Kidd, if a physician cannot form an
opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, then the jury cannot
use the information to determine their verdict. 101
Similar case precedent is seen in a variety of states since Daubert,
with courts evaluating relevance under a Rule 702 standard preferring
expert opinions rising to a probability. For example, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in Pruitt v. Powers determined that experts discussing
causation “should be confined to certain consequences or probable
consequences, and should not be permitted to testify as to possible
consequences.” 102 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed
the issue of Rule 702 relevance in Hoy v. DRM, Inc. 103 In its decision,
the court determined that expert testimony that asked the jury to
determine causation based on possibilities, not probabilities, was
“plainly . . . not helpful to a jury” and, therefore, not admissible under
96. Id. In this case, medical certainty was found due to the extent the physician in question
treated the victim for seven weeks after the crime, and the extent of his treatment and involvement
in the care of the patient. Id. at 598. Of course, this is a fact-specific inquiry that is easily avoided
by the incantation of the “reasonable medical certainty” standard at trial. In general, opinions not
stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty are not admissible. See also West v. State, 553
So. 2d 8 (Miss. 1989).
97. 951 So. 2d. 622 (Miss. App. 2007).
98. Id. at 623.
99. Id. at 626.
100. Id. (citing Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591, 597 (Miss. 1996)).
101. Id.
102. Pruitt v. Powers, 495 S.E.2d 743, 746 (N.C. 1998) (citing Fisher v. Rogers, 112 S.E.2d 76,
79 (N.C. 1960)).
103. Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 114 P.3d 1268 (Wyo. 2005).
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the “fitness” prong of the Daubert test. 104 To permit the jury to hear
expert opinion evidence in terms of possibilities is simply “asking a jury
to speculate,” so such testimony is not admissible. 105 Similar case
decisions come from other states, including Kentucky, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Texas. 106
Courts analyzing relevance of expert testimony and the strength of
opinion do not focus uniquely on Rule 702 or Daubert issues. Some
states have continued to use a modified Frye analysis after Daubert to
find that expert opinions must rise to the level of probabilities prior to
admissibility. 107
In evaluating relevance of expert testimony, many states require
that the opinion rise to the level of probability to be relevant under Rule
702 and admissible at trial, as the federal courts did in Daubert II and
Paoli.
2. Colorado Model Under 702 - Expert Opinions to Possibilities
Admissible in Both Civil and Criminal Cases
In contrast to the states that determine expert opinions are only
relevant under Rule 702 when they rise to the level of probabilities,

104. Id. at 1284.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Baylis v. Lourdes Hosp., Inc., 805 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky. 1991) (“[E]vidence of
causation must be in terms of probability rather than possibility. . . .”); Billups v. Leliuga, 398
S.E.2d 75, 77 (S.C. 1990) (citing Armstrong v. Weiland, 225 S.E.2d 851 (S.C. 1976) (when
opinions of experts are relied upon for causation, “the expert must . . . state that . . . the injuries most
probably resulted from the negligence of the defendant”)); State v. Young, No. 01C01-9605-CC00208, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 566, at *61-62 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 1998) (citations
omitted) (“Medical testimony indicating that a certain thing is ‘possible’ generally will not satisfy
the requirement of Rule 702 that an expert witness’ testimony ‘substantially assist the trier of
fact.’”); Primm v. Wickes Lumber Co., 845 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. App. 1992) (quoting Lindsey v.
Miami Dev. Corp., 689 S.W.2d 856, 862 (Tenn. 1985) (“A doctor’s testimony that a certain thing is
possible is no evidence at all,” and “the mere possibility of a causal relationship, without more, is
insufficient to qualify as an admissible expert opinion,” but noting that TENN. R. EVID. 702 is
slightly different than Federal Rule of Evidence 702)); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 706, 717 (Tex. 1997) (adopting the epidemiological test for causation requiring a “2.0” risk
to satisfy the more likely than not burden of proof, to help decide a fact at issue under Rule 702).
107. California uses the modified Frye standard. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal.).
As for the issue of possibilities and recovery, see, for example,, Simmons v. West Covina Med.
Clinic, 212 Cal. App. 3d 696, 705-06 (1989) (rejecting “lost chance” theory of recovery, deciding
that it allows recovery when an adverse result “might possibly” have been avoided) and Dumas v.
Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1593, 1605-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that lost chance theory of
recovery, allowing recovery on possibilities, would radically alter the meaning of causation). See
also Williams v. Wraxall, 33 Cal. App. 4th 120, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Dumas, 235 Cal.
App. 3d at 1608-10; Simmons, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 705-6). For the opposing viewpoint from a Frye
state, see cases cited infra note 126.
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Colorado recently adopted an approach that expert opinions rising to the
level of possibilities are relevant and admissible in both civil and
criminal cases.
Colorado adopted the Rules of Evidence effective January 1,
1980. 108 Both before and after the adoption of the Rules of Evidence,
Colorado courts of appeal ruled that expert testimony must rise to the
level of probabilities before being admissible at trial. 109 In 2001, the
Colorado Supreme Court ruled that Rule 702 had replaced Frye as the
standard for expert opinion admissibility in Colorado. 110
In People v. Ramirez, the Colorado Supreme Court evaluated the
issue of Rule 702 relevance and the certainty of opinion required for
expert admissibility. 111 In Ramirez, the court faced an appeal of a
criminal conviction, when at trial the court had permitted an expert
witness, a pediatric nurse practitioner, to testify to opinions she agreed
were not to a level of probability. 112 On appeal, the court reversed the
conviction, relying on prior cases requiring opinions to a probability
prior to being admissible at trial. 113
After accepting certiorari, the Colorado Supreme Court
reversed. 114 The court held that cases decided prior to the adoption of
the Rules of Evidence in 1979 were superseded by the Rule 702
standard, and that as a result, the cases after 1979 that relied on those
older decisions were also overruled. 115
Instead, the court held the correct standard for admissibility of
expert opinions is Colorado Rule of Evidence 702, which requires
analysis as to whether the evidence is both reliable and relevant. 116
Relevance is determined by examining whether evidence is useful to the
fact-finder in understanding other evidence or to determine a fact at
issue. 117 Usefulness to the jury hinges on whether there is a logical

108. People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 375 (Colo. 2007).
109. See Songer v. Bowman, 804 P.2d 261, 265 (Colo. App. 1990), aff’d, 820 P.2d 1110 (Colo.
1991); Thirsk v. Ethicon, Inc., 687 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Colo. App. 1983); Daugaard v. People, 488
P.2d 1101, 1103-4 (Colo. 1971); Houser v. Eckhardt, 450 P.2d 664, 668 (Colo. 1969).
110. People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001).
111. Ramirez, 155 P.3d at 375.
112. Id. at 374.
113. Id. For cases in Colorado previously holding expert opinions must rise to the level of
probability, see cases cited supra note 109.
114. Ramirez, 155 P.3d at 382.
115. Id. at 375. The cases prior to 1979 include Houser v. Eckhard, 450 P.2d 664, 668 (Colo.
1969) and Daugaard v. State, 488 P.2d 1101, 1103-4.(Colo. 1971). The post-1979 cases are
Songer, 804 P.2d at 265; and Thirsk, 687 P.2d at 1318, which rely on pre-1979 case law.
116. Id. at 378 (citing People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001)).
117. Id. at 379 (citing Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979, 989 (Colo. 2002); People v. Shreck, 22
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relationship between the testimony and the factual issues in the case. 118
The court also notes that, as a part of the reliability analysis, the expert
need not provide an opinion to a certainty. 119
Therefore, since opinions need not be stated to a certainty, a less
than certain opinion is not speculative or inadmissible under the Rule
702 reliability analysis. 120 The Supreme Court then determined that
once reliability is established, evidence rising only to the level of
possibilities is admissible as relevant under Rule 702 because it is
helpful to the jury. 121 The testimony from the expert, even if stated only
to a possibility, could help the jury weigh ambiguous evidence and could
explain the victim’s statements, so the evidence has a logical
relationship to the issues in the case. 122 As a result, the expert testimony
is useful to the jury and, therefore, relevant under Rule 702 analysis,
even when rising only to the level of possibilities. 123
Based on the decision in Ramirez, expert opinions in Colorado
rising to the level of possibilities will be admissible under Rule 702 as
relevant in both civil and criminal cases. 124
Colorado’s approach to Rule 702 relevance, permitting opinions on
possibilities, is also seen in a state with a modified Frye approach.
Illinois continues to adhere to a Frye-based standard. 125 Even under the
Illinois Frye standard, an expert may testify to possibilities at trial. 126

P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001)).
118. Id. (citing People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 323 (Colo. 2003) (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Lit., 35 F.3d 717, 743, 745 & n.13)).
119. Id. (citing Martinez, 74 P.3d at 322).
120. Id. at 381.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 382.
123. Id.
124. Ramirez, of course, is binding precedent and it specifically overrules the interpretation of
expert opinion admissibility in civil case law as well, so it applies to both civil and criminal cases.
COLO. R. EVID. 702 applies to both civil and criminal cases. COLO. R. EVID. 1101(b)
125. Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Service Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 324 (Ill. 2002) (citations
omitted); People v. Basler, 740 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 2000); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (Ill.
1996).
For
more
on
this
topic,
see
C.E.
Petit,
Illinois
Overview,
http://www.daubertontheweb.com/Illinois.htm.
126. Williams v. Manchester, 864 N.E.2d 963, 996 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (Cahill, J., dissenting)
(citing Wojcik v. City of Chicago, 702 N.E.2d 303, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)); Matuszak v. Cerniak,
805 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (citing Baird v. Adeli, 573 N.E.2d 279 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991)); Mikus v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 726 N.E.2d 95, 108 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citing Wojcik,
702 N.E.2d at 314); Wojcik, 702 N.E.2d at 314 (“A physician may testify to what might or could
have caused an injury despite any objection that the testimony is inconclusive.”); Dupree v. County
of Cook, 677 N.E.2d 1303, 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“[An expert] can testify in terms of
possibilities or probabilities as long as the opinion is based on a reasonable degree of medical
certainty.”) (citing Baird, 573 N.E.2d at 279); Baird, 573 N.E.2d at 290. For the opposing
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While many states require expert testimony to rise to probabilities
to be relevant under Rule 702, in the Daubert II and Paoli model,
Colorado recently found the opposite. It now permits expert testimony
rising to possibilities as relevant under Rule 702, similar to Hanford and
Ford.
C.

The Ohio Split Approach to Rule 702 Relevance

In contrast to the Mississippi or Colorado approaches, Ohio has a
split analysis of Rule 702 that requires expert opinions to rise to the level
of probability in civil cases, under the preponderance of the evidence
standard, but permits possibilities in criminal cases, under the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard.
Ohio first adopted the Rules of Evidence effective July 1, 1980. 127
The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the threshold for relevance of
expert testimony and the level of certainty of the expert opinion in
Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. 128
In Shumaker, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed both the
substantive burden in civil litigation and the interrelationship of an
expert’s certainty and admissibility. On the first issue, the court
reiterated that in civil litigation the burden is to prove elements of
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. 129 On the second issue,
the Shumaker court determined that expert testimony must be excluded
as speculative if the expert cannot state the opinion to a probability. 130
The basis of the probability requirement is: “[p]roof of possibility is not
sufficient to establish a fact; probability is necessary” and “[p]robable is
more than 50% of actual.” 131 Since the plaintiff’s expert in Shumaker
testified that the chemical exposure could have caused plaintiff’s injury,
the opinion should have been excluded and admission of the testimony
was erroneous. 132

viewpoint from a different Frye state, see cases cited supra note 107.
127. State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1339 (Ohio 1998). While maintaining a Frye standard
until after Daubert, Ohio has since accepted Rule 702 as the correct approach to admissibility of
expert testimony. Id.; Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735, 741 (Ohio 1998). For more on
this topic, see Daniel S. Fridman & J. Scott Janoe, The State of Judicial Gatekeeping in Ohio,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/daubert/oh.htm.
128. Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc., 504 N.E.2d 44 (Ohio 1986).
129. Id. at 46 (citing Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 272 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ohio 1971)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 46 n.3 (citing Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 103; Drew v. Indus. Comm., 26 N.E.2d 793
(Ohio 1940); Kuhn v. Banker, 13 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ohio 1938)).
132. Id. at 47. While the FED. R. EVID. had been adopted by Ohio at the time, it should be
noted that the court did not cite them in this area, relying instead on case precedent.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/1

22

Jurs: A Sensible Approach to Rule 702 Relevance
JURS_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 2:54 PM

A SENSIBLE APPROACH TO RULE 702 RELEVANCE

631

The Ohio Supreme Court again addressed the issue of expert
relevance and admissibility from Shumaker in its 1993 opinion in State
v. D’Ambrosio. 133 Following a conviction for murder, the defendant
appealed on a number of issues including the admission of expert
testimony by a prosecution expert, the Cuyahoga County Coroner, Dr.
Elizabeth Balraj. 134 Dr. Balraj testified that it was “physically possible
that all the wounds could have been made by” the knife in evidence. 135
Defendant appealed on the issue, arguing that the expert’s opinion to a
possibility was purely speculative and therefore inadmissible under Ohio
law.
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court disagreed. Citing Shumaker,
the Court stated that prior opinions held that expert testimony to
possibilities rather than probabilities is inadmissible. 136 However, the
court then stated: “we believe that the better practice, especially in
criminal cases, is to let experts testify in terms of possibility.” 137
Because Rule 702 allows expert opinion to the extent it helps the trier of
fact to understand an issue or determine a fact at issue, expert opinions
to a possibility may be admitted. 138 Since Dr. Balraj’s testimony helped
to explain that the victim’s wounds could have been caused by the knife
in evidence, despite contrary appearances, the testimony helped the jury
understand the evidence in the case. 139 As a result, the trial court
properly admitted the opinion of the coroner in D’Ambrosio under Rule
702. 140
However, in making that determination, the Ohio Supreme Court in
D’Ambrosio made a choice to separate the level of expert certainty
required for Rule 702 admissibility in civil and criminal cases. The
dichotomy remains in Ohio law today.
Criminal cases in Ohio continue to adhere to the D’Ambrosio
standard permitting expert opinion testimony on possibilities as relevant
under Rule 702. In State v. Allen, the Ohio Supreme Court determined
that the admission of a prosecution expert’s opinion that blood possibly
“could have been on the objects” in evidence at some time was properly

133. State v. D’Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909 (Ohio 1993).
134. Id. at 915.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. 504 N.E.2d 44, 44 (Ohio 1986)).
137. Id. (citing PAUL C. GIANELLI, OHIO EVIDENCE MANUAL 98 § 702.05 (1998); LOUIS A.
JACOBS, OHIO EVIDENCE 168 § 702-03 (1989)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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admitted. 141 In State v. Emerick, a court of appeals ruled that a
prosecution expert’s testimony that the victim’s death was caused by
either exposure, suffocation, or a combination of the two was admissible
at trial. 142 Finally, in State v. Jones from 2000, the Ohio Supreme Court
faced an objection to expert testimony because the experts’ opinions
lacked the appropriate degree of scientific certainty. 143
Citing
D’Ambrosio, the court held that there was no abuse of discretion in
admitting the opinions, and found no error. 144
At the same time, Ohio courts require expert opinions in civil cases
to rise to the level of probabilities before being admitted under Rule 702.
In Kerpelis v. Pfizer, Inc., an Ohio appellate court held that, when
presenting evidence of products liability, a claimant must establish a
causal connection by competent expert testimony, “and the proof in such
case must establish a probability and not a mere possibility of such
causal connection.” 145 In Squires v. Luckey Farmers, Inc., an Ohio
appellate court determined that causation expert evidence must be shown
by probability, and that opinions to a lesser degree of certainty must be
excluded as speculative. 146 In Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. White
Consolidated Industries, Inc., an Ohio appellate court stated flatly that in
civil cases “[p]roof of causation must be by probability.” 147
Based on case law following Shumaker and D’Ambrosio, Ohio has
set a precedent for a bifurcated Rule 702 test for relevance based on
whether the case is civil or criminal. This approach takes into account
the varying burdens of proof in the two types of cases, and the
usefulness to the jury standard. 148
In 2006, the Ohio approach became law by statute for courts in the
State of Georgia. Pursuant to the Georgia Code, opinions of experts in
criminal cases on “any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions

141. State v. Allen, 653 N.E.2d 675, 685 (Ohio 1995) (citing D’Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d at 915;
State v. Bayliss, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1058-59, vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978)).
142. State v. Emerick, 670 N.E.2d 1060, 1062-63 (Ohio App. 1995) (citing D’Ambrosio, 616
N.E.2d at 915). The court also rejected the defense claim that the D’Ambrosio position on expert
opinions to possibilities was merely dicta. Id. at 1063 n.2.
143. State v. Jones, 739 N.E.2d 300 (Ohio 2000).
144. Id. at 315.
145. Kerpelis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01-CV-1310, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2700, (Ohio Ct. App.
June 7, 2004) (citing Stacey v. Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp., 101 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Ohio 1951); OHIO R.
EVID. 702).
146. Squires v. Luckey Farmers, Inc., No. 01-CVC-320, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4462, at *9
(citing Shumaker v. Cannon & Sons, Inc., 504 N.E.2d 44, 46 n.3 (Ohio 1986)).
147. Donegal Mut. Ins. v. White Consol. Indus., 852 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ohio 2006) (citing
Shumaker, 504 N.E.2d at 44).
148. See infra section IV.
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shall always be admissible.” 149 Meanwhile, the Georgia Code precludes
admissibility of expert opinions in civil cases until the court determines
those opinions are based on sufficient facts and data, based on reliable
principles, and the principles have been applied reliably to the facts of
the case. 150 Further, the code specifically mentions that it is the intent of
the legislature that:
the courts of the State of Georgia not be viewed as open to expert
evidence that would not be admissible in other states. Therefore, in
interpreting and applying this code section, the courts of this state may
draw from the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in
[Daubert, Joiner, and Kuhmo]; and other cases in federal courts
applying the standards announced by the United States Supreme Court
in these cases. 151

Based on the statutes, Georgia also applies a split-standard for
expert relevance, allowing testimony on all scientific issues in criminal
cases and requiring a heightened showing, consistent with Daubert,
before expert opinions are admissible in civil trials. Further, the statute
specifically mentions a restrictive view on expert opinion admissibility
in civil cases. 152
Based on case law or by statute, Ohio and Georgia have a split
approach to Rule 702 admissibility of expert opinions, based on whether
the case is civil or criminal, demonstrating a new and sensible analysis
of Rule 702 relevance.
IV. OHIO REPRESENTS A SENSIBLE APPROACH TO THE RELEVANCE
ISSUE
The split approach from Ohio offers considerable advantages for
both the civil cases, under the expert opinion probabilities requirement,
and the criminal cases, allowing expert opinions on possibilities. The
Ohio solution offers a practical resolution of the federal and state court
disputes on the level of certainty required for an expert opinion before it
is admissible as reliable under Rule 702.

149.
150.
151.
152.
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In Civil Cases, Rule 702 Relevance Should Require Expert
Opinions to a Probability

Under Rule 702, an expert’s opinion may only be admitted to assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact at issue.
For civil cases, expert opinions should rise to the level of probabilities
before being relevant for the jury’s consideration under the Rule 702
standard. This standard appropriately takes into account the burden of
proof, prevents the invitation of speculation by the jury, avoids
absurdity, and takes into account other appropriate concerns regarding
the role of experts in civil litigation.
1. Requiring Probabilities in Civil Cases Appropriately Takes into
Account the Preponderance of the Evidence Burden of Proof
Admission of expert opinion to a probability is based on deference
to the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof in civil cases. The
first federal appellate decisions on Rule 702 relevance relied heavily on
the connection to the burden of proof in requiring expert testimony to a
level of probability. 153 State decisions since then echo this concern. 154
In Paoli, the Third Circuit recognized that relevance of expert
opinions is measured by the ability of the scientific research or test to
address the particular factual disputes in the case. 155 Since the
substantive standard for civil torts is preponderance of the evidence, the
court concluded that the admission of expert testimony necessarily must
reflect that burden of proof. 156 Therefore, when the burden of proof is
the preponderance of the evidence, expert opinions to a possibility or
even “strong possibility” do not assist the trier of fact, and are therefore
inadmissible as not helpful to the jury under Rule 702. 157
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Daubert II mirrors the Paoli concern
with the issue of the substantive burden shaping the relevance of expert
testimony under Rule 702. In Daubert II, the court recognized that the
burden of proof required the plaintiffs to prove the medication more

153. Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35
F.3d 717, 750 (3d Cir. 1994).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 101-106.
155. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir.
1985)).
156. Id. at 750-51.
157. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/1

26

Jurs: A Sensible Approach to Rule 702 Relevance
JURS_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 2:54 PM

A SENSIBLE APPROACH TO RULE 702 RELEVANCE

635

likely than not caused their injuries. 158 To do so, the court reasoned that
the relative risk must exceed “2.0” for the risk to have been more than
doubled, making the injuries more likely than not caused by the
medication. 159 Based on this civil standard of preponderance of the
evidence, the court determined that evidence of possibilities tends to
disprove legal causation since it is inadequate for the jury to make a
positive finding. 160 Therefore, the Daubert II court held that the
evidence should speak “clearly and directly” to an issue in dispute in the
case, 161 and only opinions stated to probabilities do so in a civil case
with the preponderance of the evidence standard.
Similar logic underscores multiple other federal and state civil
cases evaluating expert opinions. In Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., a
federal district court evaluated expert opinions in light of the Indiana
standard requiring a preponderance of the evidence in civil cases. 162 The
court stated that “testimony as to mere possibilities will not alone suffice
to place a fact in issue.” 163 Expert opinions relating a “hypothetical or
inferential causal relation between a drug and a disease is not probative
and cannot provide the basis for a reasonable finding of fact.” 164
Therefore, the court held that opinions of the plaintiff’s experts in the
case did not rise to the level at which they would assist the jury in their
determinations as required under Rule 702 and should be excluded. 165
The Texas Supreme Court in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v.
Haven stated that Rule 702, in requiring courts to determine if expert
opinion will assist the jury to determine a fact at issue, offers
“substantive guidelines in determining if the expert testimony is some
Therefore, relying on the
evidence of probative value.” 166
epidemiological analysis of Daubert II and similar cases, the court
affirmed that only evidence to a risk of “2.0” is relevant to the case for a
finding of causation to a preponderance of the evidence. 167

158. Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320 (citing Jones v. Ortho Pharms. Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 396,
403 (Cal. App. 1985)).
159. Id. at 1321 (citing DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir.
1990)).
160. Id. at 1321 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 1321 n.17.
162. Porter v. Whitehall Lab. Inc., 791 F.Supp. 1335 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
163. Id. at 1346 (citing Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d 722, 731 (Ind.
1982); Watson v. Med. Emergency Serv. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1191, 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)).
164. Id. at 1345.
165. Id. at 1352.
166. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. 1997).
167. Id. at 717 (citations omitted).
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The Wyoming Supreme Court mirrored this restrictive analysis in
Hoy v. DRM. 168 After determining that the plaintiff’s experts’ opinions
were stated only to a possibility, the court held that the lack of
probability in the opinions “prevents their opinions from being ‘helpful’
to the jury as contemplated by [Rule] 702.” 169 The opinions fail to assist
a jury to make a determination to a preponderance of the evidence, and
as such, fail to be relevant to the issues in the case under Rule 702. 170
Together, these cases from both federal and state courts indicate the
interrelationship of the preponderance of the evidence standard and Rule
702 relevance, and uphold the requirement that expert testimony to
probabilities is required to merit Rule 702 relevance in civil cases. 171
Rule 702 opinion testimony to a probability of the evidence takes into
account the civil standard of proof. This standard appropriately requires
litigants to obtain experts who can testify that the jury should find, more
likely than not, that their analysis is correct. Anything less invites
speculation.
2. Expert Opinions to Probabilities for Rule 702 Relevance
Prevent Speculation
Case decisions in Daubert II, Paoli, Porter, Havner, and Hoy show
the requirement that Rule 702 opinions must rise to probabilities to assist
the jury. These cases and other appellate decisions also demonstrate one
major danger of permitting possibility opinions in civil cases – inviting
speculation.
The Daubert II court first addressed the issue of speculation and
how it relates to Rule 702 relevance and probabilities. The court
cautioned that expert opinions to a probability should speak “clearly and
directly” to an issue in the case, but also that the court must be careful
not to permit lesser testimony that can mislead the jury. 172 The jury can
be misled by possibilities evidence because it is an insufficient basis on
which to rest a finding to a preponderance of the evidence.
The Hoy decision by the Wyoming Supreme Court specifically
addressed the speculation issue first addressed in Daubert II. In Hoy, the
expert testified to causation in the form of possibilities. 173 The court
168. Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 114 P.3d 1268, 1284 (Wyo. 2005).
169. Id. at 1284.
170. Id.
171. To the extent that several other courts permit possibilities, such as Hanford, Ramirez, or
the Illinois cases, they are evaluated infra section IV(A)(2).
172. Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 n.17 (9th Cir. 1995).
173. Hoy, 114 P.3d at 1284.
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determined that, under Rule 702, the experts’ opinions on possibilities
were not helpful to a fact at issue since they were not an appropriate
basis for a jury to make a finding to a preponderance of the evidence. 174
However, the court also noted that, since the experts lacked a basis to
ask the jury to make a finding to a preponderance of the evidence, the
possibilities opinions were “merely asking [the] jury to speculate,”
because the analytical gap between the legally inadequate opinions and a
finding of causation was too great. 175
Similarly, in the Cockrell v. LeMaire case from the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, the court stated that expert opinion evidence must rise
to the level of probabilities and cannot address possibilities. Otherwise,
“the expert is merely speculating, [and] he is in no better position than
the jury to form an opinion and his speculations should be excluded.” 176
In contrast, the cases permitting expert testimony to a lesser degree
of certainty then probabilities - Hanford, Ramirez, and the Illinois
cases 177 - invite speculation.
In Hanford, the court permitted the experts to testify to causation
that does not meet the “2.0” relative risk established in Daubert II. 178
Relying on prior radiation exposure case law, the court determined that
any exposure could cause the injuries, so no requirement for a doubling
dose would be required. 179 Based on this determination, a plaintiff in the
lawsuit exposed merely to a background level of radiation, less than the
“2.0” level of relative risk, may present expert evidence that his or her
cancer was caused by the defendants and invite the jury to speculate that
the causation has been established as more likely than not. Opening the
door for the jury to make a finding on inadequate evidence, less than a
“2.0” risk level, is an invitation to speculation. 180
The Colorado Supreme Court decision in Ramirez also invites
speculation since, in overruling prior civil cases requiring evidence to
rise to the level of probabilities, the court expressly permits experts in
civil cases to provide Rule 702 opinions not rising to the level of the
burden of proof. 181 While the court states that evidence that is reliable
174. Id.; supra text accompanying note 169.
175. Id. at 1284.
176. Cockrell v. LeMaire, No. COA03-327, 2004 N.C. App. LEXIS 142, at *3 (N.C. App.
January 20, 2004) (citing State v. Bowen, 139 N.C. App. 18, 31-32 (N.C. App. 2000)).
177. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
178. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002).
179. Id. (citing In re Three Mile Island Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 727 n.179 (3d Cir. 1999)).
180. But see supra notes 58, 77 and accompanying text.
181. People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 379-80 (Colo. 2007). See also supra text
accompanying notes 111-120.
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under Daubert-like analysis is not speculative and, therefore, is
appropriate for the jury’s consideration, the analysis more appropriately
applies to criminal cases alone and fails to establish that the same
reasoning on usefulness applies in the civil context. 182
While evaluated under a modified-Frye analysis, Illinois case law
also shows the dangers of permitting testimony on possibilities in civil
cases. In Wojcik, the court permitted an expert physician to testify to
opinions to the level of possibility, stating that “[a] physician may testify
to what might or could have caused an injury despite any objection that
the testimony is inconclusive.” 183 The court, therefore, leaves the jury to
decide whether the totality of the evidence meets the burden of proof.
The court’s analysis leads to difficulty in a Rule 702 context because, as
a matter of law, courts admit expert opinions solely to assist the trier of
fact in an area of specialization outside of common knowledge. 184
When possibilities opinions enter into evidence, expert testimony is
presented to the jury on issues for which the jury must make complex
determinations of sufficiency and credibility. These technical or
scientific issues address areas in which the jury has little or no prior
knowledge to independently evaluate the experts. The situation created
by admitting possibilities, therefore, invites the jury to speculate on
issues outside their knowledge and to make necessarily uninformed
decisions.
Cases addressing the relevancy prong of Rule 702 and denying
expert opinions on possibilities reject the invitation to speculation by
requiring probabilities from experts, based on the civil burden of proof.
3. Opinions to a Probability Avoid the Absurdity of Experts
Testifying on Issues to a Possibility and, as a Member of the
Jury, Voting Otherwise
In addition to accounting for the burden of proof and rejecting an
invitation for speculation, the Ohio requirement in civil cases for opinion
testimony to rise to probabilities before Rule 702 relevance is
established also avoids absurdity.
One canon of judicial interpretation is to avoid interpreting a statute

182. Id. For an analysis of why Ramirez is correct in the criminal context only, see infra
section IV.B.
183. Wojcik v. City of Chicago, 702 N.E.2d 303, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
184. FED. R. EVID. 702 and advisory committee notes to 1972 proposed rules (citing Ladd,
supra note 8, at 418).
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or rule in a manner that creates an absurd result. 185 Permitting an expert
to testify to an opinion held only to a possibility results in an absurd
situation: the expert testifies on an issue, on behalf of her client, when
the expert would not be able to make a finding on that issue in the
client’s favor. In other words, the expert testifies when he or she could
not vote on the issue in the manner he or she is advocating. Rule 702
interpretation cannot result in this absurd situation.
This absurdity is touched upon in the Mississippi case Catchings v.
State. In the case, the court noted that, within the medical community,
the standard for fact-finding is a “reasonable medical certainty.” 186 As a
result, “if a physician cannot form an opinion with sufficient certainty so
as to make a medical judgment, neither can a jury use that information to
reach a decision.” 187 The Catchings court requires a medical certainty or
probability prior to admissibility, and in doing so, avoids the absurdity
issue raised by opinions on possibilities.
In addition to the Catchings analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Kuhmo cautions that the overriding concern of Daubert’s gatekeeping
function is to ensure that an expert “employs in the courtroom the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
the relevant field.” 188 In that context, the expert testifying to an opinion
to a possibility, if asked and applying the same intellectual rigor to the
field, must confess that he or she could not make a finding on that issue
to a probability, as the jury is being asked to do. 189
To avoid the pitfalls of the expert in a civil case testifying to
possibilities, the better practice is for courts to deny Rule 702 relevance
to possibility opinions in civil cases, consistent with the Ohio example.
By applying the Ohio interpretation of Rule 702, courts avoid absurdity,
consistent with black letter rules of judicial interpretation, preserve the
expert’s credibility when cross-examined, and apply the same level of
intellectual rigor in the courtroom as in the laboratory.

185. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1992) (interpreting statute); Perry v.
Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (interpreting statute); Fallen v. United States, 378
U.S. 139, 144 (1964) (interpreting federal rules of criminal procedure). See generally John F.
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2393-2431 (2003) (discussing the
absurdity rule in American law).
186. Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1996) (citing Bethany v. Stubbs, 393 So.
2d 1351, 1354 (Miss. 1981)).
187. Id. at 597 (citing Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 208 (3d. Cir. 1991)).
188. Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
189. See FED. R. EVID. 704 (opinion on ultimate issue).
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4. Other Concerns
Ohio case law admitting only probability opinions in civil cases
includes considerations of the civil burden of proof and the goals of
resisting jury speculation, and avoiding absurdity. In addition to these
concerns, the Ohio rule also has several other results that positively
affect the aims and role of the judicial process.
a. Differences Between Legal Relevance and Practical
Relevance
First, the Ohio rule requiring probabilities opinions in civil cases
takes into account a major distinction between legal relevance and
practical relevance. A possibility opinion may, as a practical effect,
persuade the jury to vote in favor of the expert’s opinion. However, it
legally should not do so when only to the level of possibility since it, as
a matter of law, is an insufficient basis for a verdict.
The concern of practical versus legal relevance is addressed in
Porter v. Whitehall Industries, when the court states “[a]n opinion
tending to sway the jurors is not equivalent to an opinion tending to
prove a fact. When evidence would merely affect a lay person’s
‘irrational’ opinion about a fact rather than providing reliable proof of
that fact, the evidence is neither probative nor admissible.” 190
Therefore, to avoid the irrational effects of practical relevance, the better
approach is to deny admissibility to possibilities opinions as not legally
relevant.
b. Negative Effect of Possibilities on the Outside-theCourtroom Practices of Professionals
A second concern in favor of the Ohio rule is the effect of the Rule
702 standard on the practices of professionals outside the courtroom
when they must defend against possibilities opinions in negligence
cases. In the context of medical malpractice litigation, the California
Court of Appeals addressed this concern in Simmons. In Simmons, the
court rejected the invitation to permit recovery on evidence rising only
to possibilities, relying on three major practical effects on physicians. 191
The court therefore determined that, because of these effects, permitting
recovery based on possibilities would be contrary to logic, precedent,

190. Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 791 F.Supp. 1335, 1345 n.9 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
191. Simmons v. West Covina Med. Clinic, 212 Cal. App. 3d 705, 706 (Cal. App. 1989).
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and public policy. 192
One effect of permitting recovery on possibilities is to “encourage
costly and unreasonable over-testing and over-treatment for defensive
purposes. Physicians would find it necessary to place the requirements
of the legal system before the needs and finances of the patient.” 193 The
concern of courtroom standards for evidence therefore can have direct
and negative effects on patient care in a health care context, and the
Ohio rule restricts this concern, as the court did in Simmons.
The second effect of permitting recovery on possibilities is that “the
physicians’ increased exposure to liability would adversely impact
already high medical malpractice premiums, resulting in an upward
spiral of consumer costs.” 194 While written in 1989, the opinion
correctly anticipated the effect insurance rate and consumer cost
difficulties would have on the practical ability of health care providers to
practice. 195 To limit this effect, a court should limit physicians’
exposure to inadequate lawsuits by applying the Ohio relevance rule and
denying admissibility to expert opinions rising only to a possibility.
The effect of expert opinions to possibilities does not solely affect
health care providers, as discussed in Simmons. Rather, the concern
extends to other professionals, including those practicing law. The
California Court of Appeals addressed this concern in Dumas v. Cooney,
where the court cautioned that recovery from professionals for
possibilities would extend beyond the Simmons situation with
physicians, and allow a disgruntled litigant to sue his or her own
attorney for a negative verdict. 196 Such results are to be avoided for the
same reasons as stated in Simmons, as violating sound logic, legal
precedent, and public policy. 197
Finally, the Simmons court theorized that the uncertainty created by
allowing recovery based on possibility opinions would “open the

192. Id. at 705.
193. Id. at 705-06.
194. Id. at 706.
195. See, e.g., Alaistair MacLennan, M.D., Karin B. Nelson, M.D., Gary Hankins, M.D., &
Michael Speer, M.D., Who Will Deliver Our Grandchildren? Implications of Cerebral Palsy
Litigation, 294 JAMA 1688 (2005); Richard E. Anderson, M.D., Defending the Practice of
Medicine, 164 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1173 (2004); Robert G. Brooks, M.D., Nir Menachemi, Ph.D.,
Cathy Hughes, M.S.W., & Art Clawson, M.S., Impact Of The Medical Professional Liability
Insurance On Access To Care In Florida, 164 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2217 (2004); Patrick J. Hope,
Reforming the Medical Professional Liability Insurance System, 114 AM. J. MED. 622 (2003).
196. Dumas v. Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1593, 1609 (Cal. App. 1991).
197. Id. at 1607 (citing Simmons v. West Covina Med. Clinic, 212 Cal. App. 3d 705, 705-06
(Cal. App. 1989)).
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proverbial floodgates of our overburdened judicial system.” 198 While
unrelated to the defendant’s liability, this practical effect deals with the
administration of justice and the ability of the justice system to handle
large numbers of suits effectively. The Ohio interpretation preventing
this result, then, is consistent with the judicial interpretation of both the
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence: “to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” 199
The effect of admission of possibilities opinions dictates use of the
Ohio rule in civil liability cases in order to prevent defensive practices
by health care or other professionals, to limit growth of skyrocketing
insurance premiums, and to prevent overburdening the legal system.
c. Special Role of Experts in Lawsuits Mandates Caution
The special and persuasive role of experts in litigation is an
additional practical reason to limit the admissibility of possibilities
opinion evidence. Because experts testify necessarily on areas in which
the jury lacks knowledge, the jury lacks the ability to evaluate the
Because the lack of knowledge can be
testimony critically. 200
misleading to a lay jury, the courts should use an abundance of caution
prior to admitting weak expert opinions into trial. 201
The Daubert II court recognized this concern, stating that since the
expert role in the case is one so potentially “powerful and . . .
misleading,” the courts should exclude opinions with the potential to
mislead the jury unless clearly related to the issues in the case. 202 An
expert opinion to the level of possibilities lacks legal relevance, but can
be powerful and misleading due to the practical effect of persuasive
expert opinions. Because of this result, expert opinions to a possibility
should be excluded per Daubert II, as they are under the Ohio relevance
test.
Analysis of the interrelationship of the burden of proof and Rule
702 relevance, the discouraging of speculation, the role of absurdity in
judicial interpretation of Rule 702, and the other effects of the Ohio rule
leads to the conclusion that in civil litigation an expert opinion should
only be relevant and admissible under Rule 702 if it rises to the level of

198. Simmons, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 706.
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See also FED. R. EVID. 102.
200. See supra section IV.A.3 and text accompanying notes 188-189.
201. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (citing Weinstein, supra
note 23, at 632.
202. Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 n.17 (9th Cir. 1995).
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probabilities.
B.

In Criminal Cases, the Correct Rule 702 Relevance Standard is
Expert Opinions to a Possibility

In contrast to civil litigation, expert opinions stated as possibilities
should be admitted in criminal cases for jury consideration under Rule
702. The criminal cases permitting expert admissibility on possibilities,
Ford, Ramirez, and D’Ambrosio, contrast with other cases that strictly
hold to the probability standard, and show the practicality of the Ohio
Rule 702 relevance rule. The Ohio rule appropriately accounts for the
different burden of proof in criminal cases, and avoids the absurdity
issue that results from admitting possibilities in civil cases.
1. The Admission of Expert Opinions to Possibilities Takes into
Account the Criminal Burden of Proof, as Demonstrated in
Cases Examining Rule 702 Expert Testimony in the Criminal
Context
The Daubert opinion cautioned that relevance under Rule 702
required “a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility.” 203 Part of this analysis is to determine
whether the expert testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts to aid the
jury in the resolution of a factual dispute. 204 “Expert testimony which
does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non
helpful.” 205
Consistent with the Ohio case law, the relevance standard under
Rule 702 should require expert opinions in civil litigation to rise to
probabilities prior to being admitted. 206 This result appropriately takes
into account the burden of proof, declines to invite speculation, avoids
absurdity, and has significant beneficial practical effects.
However, Rule 702 relevance is appropriately modified in the
criminal case law based on the criminal burden of proof. Expert
opinions to possibilities can assist a jury in a criminal case in evaluating
the evidence and resolving a factual dispute, so the opinions retain their
relevance for admission under Rule 702.
Cases evaluating the relevance of expert testimony in criminal
203. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
204. Id. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d. Circ. 1985)). See
also Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92).
205. Id. at 591 (citing WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11, at 702-718).
206. See supra section IV(A).
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cases recognize the affect of the burden of proof in criminal cases on
Rule 702 relevance. In United States v. Ford, the Third Circuit’s
evaluation of the testimony of a shoeprint identification expert began
with the Daubert standard that relevance requires the evidence to assist
the trier of fact. 207 Although the expert testified only that the shoes the
defendant wore “could not be ruled out” as a source of the shoeprint at
the crime scene, the testimony remained relevant because the testimony
is probative of whether the defendant participated in the crime. 208 The
Ford court reiterated that the standard for relevancy, in this context, “is
not that high.” 209
Unlike the civil litigation context, where the shoe imprint testimony
would not be helpful to the jury to decide liability until it became
probable that the shoe was the defendant’s, the expert testimony in Ford
does help the jury in their overall analysis of whether the defendant
participated in the robbery by tying the shoes he wore when
apprehended to the shoes in the robbery. The Third Circuit decided this
is “clearly relevant” to the issues, and should be admitted even if only in
terms of possibility. 210
The Colorado Supreme Court similarly evaluated expert testimony
under Rule 702 in its decision in Ramirez. 211 The court first determined
that Rule 702 requires relevance and reliability prior to admissibility. 212
When determining relevance, the issue is one of usefulness to the
jury. 213 Usefulness is based on “whether there is a logical relationship
between the proffered testimony and the factual issues in the case.” 214
The court then evaluated the expert testimony of the pediatric nurse
practitioner, who testified that the physical findings of her evaluation of
the victim were “suspicious.” 215 Since the criminal case hinged on
whether the victim had been assaulted, and the opinion contradicted the
emergency department physician who had examined the victim and

207. United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
208. Id. at 220-21 (citing United States v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 988 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1346-47
(8th Cir. 1984)). Participation in the crime, of course, is established under the beyond the
reasonable doubt standard.
209. Id. at 219 (citing Lauria v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 600 (3d Cir. 1998)
(quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994))).
210. Id. at 220-21.
211. People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 378 (Colo. 2007).
212. Id. at 378 (citing People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001)).
213. Id. at 379 (citing Shreck, 22 P.3d at 77).
214. Id. (citing People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 323 (Colo. 2003)).
215. Id. at 381.
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stated the exam was normal, the nurse’s testimony had a “direct logical
relation” to the factual issues in the case. 216 Otherwise, the jury would
be left with the misleading impression that the health care providers who
examined the victim agreed that the examination was normal.
Expert testimony to a possibility is also appropriately admitted as
relevant under Rule 702 by the Ohio Supreme Court in D’Ambrosio. 217
Similar to the nurse in Ramirez, the coroner in D’Ambrosio testified that
the victim’s wounds “could have been made by” the weapon in evidence
at trial. 218 The testimony by the coroner demonstrates to the jury “that,
despite contrary appearances, the size of the wound was consistent with
the size and shape of [the knife in evidence].” 219 Because of the
helpfulness to the jury in understanding the evidence at trial, the
testimony had Rule 702 relevance. 220 Otherwise, the jury would be left
with a misleading impression that the knife was unable to make the
wounds on the victim.
Similar to Ford, the Ramirez and D’Ambrosio decisions
demonstrate that expert testimony that fails to rise to the level of
probability can, in criminal cases, be appropriately considered by the
jury. The Ohio solution to Rule 702 relevance permits this possibility
evidence for criminal cases based on the varying jury determination to
be made under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
The Ford, Ramirez, and D’Ambrosio decisions stand in contrast to
the criminal opinions that required expert opinions stated to a
probability: Catchings and State v. Young. 221 In Catchings, the court
determined that any testimony that failed to rise to the level of
reasonable medical certainty would not be admissible. 222 The testimony
in Catchings was from a physician who, after the defendant struck the
victim with a sawhorse, treated the victim for seven weeks prior to his
death. 223 The expert failed to state his opinions to a reasonable medical
certainty, so ordinarily the testimony would be inadmissible. 224
In Catchings, the court did admit the testimony in the end. 225 The

216. Id. at 382 (citing Martinez, 74 P.3d at 323).
217. State v. D’Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909, 915 (Ohio 1993).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591 (Miss. 1996); State v. Young, No. 01C01-9605-CC00208, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 566, at *61-62 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 1998).
222. Catchings, 684 So. 2d at 597.
223. Id. at 597- 98.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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court determined that, while he had not stated so, the physician’s opinion
“evidences the certainty required for admission.” 226 In doing so, the
court reached the correct result consistent with the basic principles of
Rule 702 relevance. Instead of making a finding that the testimony was
to a probability when it did not contain that certainty, the court could
have applied the “split standard” for Rule 702 relevance from Ohio,
consistent with the underlying purposes of Rule 702 opinions as stated
since Daubert. Since the issue of the physician’s opinion on death
related to a fact at issue in the case, whether or not the defendant caused
the victim’s death and is guilty, the Ohio approach permits the evidence
without the court requiring a retrospective approach to the testimony and
a post hoc finding of probability.
A similar result is seen in State v. Young from the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals. In that case, the medical examiner testified to the
results of his examination of the victim but, as in Catchings, failed to
While the court
testify to a “reasonable medical certainty.” 227
determined that Tennessee law requires testimony to a reasonable medial
certainty to be relevant under Rule 702, the court evaluated the specific
language used by this medical examiner and, like Catchings, determined
that the “doctor’s responses were clear and unequivocal.” 228 Therefore,
his testimony was “not so speculative that it was not of substantial
assistance to the jury.” 229 Just as in Catchings, the Young decision
shows that, in lieu of verbal gymnastics to ensure an opinion is deemed
to be to a probability, the better approach is to permit testimony to a
possibility. This approach is consistent with the basic principle of Rule
702 admissibility since Daubert: to help the jury evaluate a fact at issue
and the evidence in the case.
The Ohio approach permits expert testimony in criminal cases
under a Rule 702 standard admitting possibilities, which allows
testimony on issues useful to the jury by appropriately adjusting the
relevance standard for the criminal law burden of proof. Criminal cases
taking a dogmatic approach to expert testimony often reach the same
result. However, courts applying the dogmatic approach must stretch

226. Id.
227. State v. Young, No. 01C01-9605-CC-00208, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 566, at *62
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 1998).
228. Id. at *64.
229. Id. at *65. The Court does find harmless error in the admission of some medical examiner
testimony that was “indefinite and vague” and “invited speculation,” but those responses of the
medical examiner are so indefinite as to time that they could have been inadmissible under the
possibilities standard under the Ohio rule. Id. at *65-66.
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their analysis of the expert opinions in order to find that they are to a
probability, and therefore admissible. An adjustment of the relevance
standard reaches the same result through the application of pre-existing
rules and considerations. The Ohio evaluation of Rule 702 relevance
adjusts for the varying burden of proof by admitting evidence at criminal
trials that is appropriate to the issues in those trials even though the same
evidence would not be admissible in civil cases.
2. Absurdity Issue for Civil Cases Not Present for Criminal Cases
Permitting expert testimony rising to the level of possibilities in
criminal cases, under the Ohio approach to Rule 702, does not invite
absurdity as in civil cases. 230
In the context of civil cases to a preponderance of the evidence, the
admission of possibilities testimony permits an expert to opine on an
issue on which he or she could not make a finding in favor of his or her
client as a member of the jury. 231 By permitting this result, the civil
courts’ dogmatic approach results in an absurdity. 232
However, in the criminal law context, expert testimony to a
possibility does not result in an absurdity. For example, in Ford, the
prosecution expert testifying on the shoe print comparison to a
possibility could, as a theoretical jury member, vote for conviction. The
same is true for the nurse in Ramirez, the coroner in D’Ambrosio, the
physician in Catchings, and the medical examiner in Young.
As a result, the split-relevancy approach to Rule 702 excludes
possibilities in civil cases because of the absurdity of the result, but
permits expert opinions to a possibility in criminal cases when the
absurdity no longer is an issue due to the varying standard of proof.
Expert opinions to the level of possibilities can, in the criminal
context, help the jury evaluate the evidence and determine facts while
avoiding the misleading impressions of the events that could result if the
opinions are not admitted. Analysis of the interrelationship of the
criminal burden of proof and Rule 702 relevance, by examining the
criminal case law, leads to the conclusion that, in criminal law, an expert
opinion should be admissible when only rising to the level of
possibilities.

230. See supra section IV.A.3.
231. Id.
232. Id.; see also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The 1993 Supreme Court decision in Daubert determined that Rule
702 provided the appropriate test for the admissibility of expert
testimony, and that expert testimony should be deemed both reliable and
relevant prior to admission at trial.
Since 1993, federal and state courts have evaluated the issue of
Rule 702 relevance with different results. Federal appellate decisions
shortly after Daubert, such as Daubert II and Paoli, determined that
expert opinions should only be admitted as relevant under Rule 702
when they rise to the level of probabilities. Multiple federal district
courts since Daubert II and Paoli adopted this approach.
More recently, federal appellate decisions in cases such as Hanford
and Ford admitted expert testimony stated as possibilities. The 2004
decision of Judge Blackburn in Kaiser-Hill denied that Rule 702 requires
expert opinions to any particular level of certainty.
State courts also have varying approaches to the issue. Some states,
like Mississippi in the Catchings and Kidd cases, require expert
testimony to rise to the level of medical probability prior to admission in
both the civil and criminal context. On the other hand, other states like
Colorado permit expert testimony of possibilities in both civil and
criminal cases. In contrast to both the Mississippi and Colorado
examples, the state of Ohio adopted a split approach for Rule 702
relevance in D’Ambrosio: permitting expert testimony of possibilities in
the criminal context but insisting expert opinions rise to the level of
probabilities to be relevant in civil cases.
The Ohio example in D’Ambrosio offers a sensible approach to the
Rule 702 relevance issue. Requiring expert testimony to probabilities in
civil cases appropriately takes into account the preponderance of the
evidence standard. In addition, the standard avoids an invitation to jury
speculation and absurdity of an expert’s position vis-à-vis their client’s
claims, both of which would result from admitting expert opinions to
possibilities. Finally, the requirement of expert opinions to probabilities
in civil cases has several other beneficial effects: it takes into account the
difference between practical relevance to sway a jury and legal relevance
to make a finding; it reduces out-of-the-courtroom practice changes for
professionals seeking to avoid exposure to liability based on
possibilities; and it mandates caution for the judicial process based on
the special persuasive effect of experts to a lay jury.
The Ohio example for Rule 702 relevance also appropriately
permits expert opinions rising to the level of possibilities in criminal
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cases. This approach permits expert opinions that assist the jury in
evaluating the evidence, making a determination on a fact at issue, and
avoiding misleading impressions of evidence by permitting greater
leeway in their level of certainty. In analyzing the cases permitting
expert testimony to possibilities, such as Ford, Ramirez and
D’Ambrosio, the possibility expert opinions that were admitted
appropriately assisted the jury to resolve the issues in those cases, and,
therefore, maintained relevance under Rule 702.
The Ohio split approach is a sensible way to analyze Rule 702
expert opinion relevance, taking into account the burdens of proof in
civil and criminal cases and balancing the effects on litigants. It should
be adopted by other jurisdictions as a practical and bright-line approach
to determine Rule 702 relevance and, therefore, admissibility of expert
opinions with varying levels of certainty.
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